Our Moral Duty to Eat Meat [Texte]
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021
I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has benefited animals. The existence of domesticated animals depends on the practice of eating them, and the meat-eating practice benefits animals of that kind if they have good lives. The argument is not consequentialist but historical, and it does not apply to nondomesticated animals. I refine the argument and consider objections.
[…] The emphasis among the defenders of so-called animal liberation or animal rights on animal pain and suffering rather than on animal pleasure and happiness is bizarre and disturbing (for example, Singer Singer1975; Regan Regan1983). The only explanation I can think of is that this emphasis is a form of what is called speciesism: animal pleasure and happiness are discounted just because they are not of our species.
[…] Like human beings, animals have pains and miseries, but like human beings, a great many of the animals we eat also have considerably more pleasure and happiness in their lives than pain and misery. Therefore, we should eat them.
The level of antispeciesism is conceived as the weight on animals’ welfare in the utilitarian social welfare function. We show that more antispeciesism increases meat consumption if and only if animals’ utility is positive. That is, the critical condition is whether farm animals’ lives are worth living.
Parental compromise [PDF]
Marcus William Hunt
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2019
I assume the case in which a vegan parent is committed to the idea of raising their child on a vegan diet, and their omnivorous co-parent is committed to the idea of raising their child on an omnivorous diet. That is, prior to factoring in any reasons relating to the commitments of their co-parent, each co-parent has differing commitments about what diet their child should have.
Veganism and Children: Physical and Social Well-Being [Texte]
Marcus William Hunt
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2019
parents have a significant pro tanto moral reason not to raise their child on a vegan diet due to the risk of harm that such a diet poses to the child’s physical and social well-being
Veganism and Children: A Response to Marcus William Hunt [Texte]
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2019
In this paper, I discuss Hunt’s argument and show that (1) the assertion that a vegan diet bears any physical and social risk to children is a misconception, (2) the moral reasons that vegan parents may have for raising their children on a vegan diet outweigh the reasons for raising their children on an animal-based diet, and (3) vegan parents have strong reasons that generate a moral obligation to raise their children on a vegan diet.
Should vegans compromise? (Critical Review of International Social and
Political Philosophy, 2020) [PDF]
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2020
In two recent articles, Marcus William Hunt has posed questions about raising children as vegans. In ‘Parental Compromise’, he argues that pro-vegan-children parents should compromise with anti-vegan-children co-parents, and, in ‘Veganism and Children’, he challenges arguments in favour of vegan parenting. I argue that his pro-compromise position overlooks the idea that respect for animal rights is a duty of justice, and thus not something to
be compromised on lightly. To demonstrate the plausibility of this position, I challenge his arguments that Tom Regan’s case for animal rights does not endorse vegan parenting. Nonetheless, I argue that there may be space for pro-vegan-children parents to compromise with anti-vegan-children parents over ‘unusual eating’. This seeks out unusual sources of animal protein that do not involve violations of animals’ rights.
Zero-compromise veganism [PDF]
Ethics and education, 2021
What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to
raise their children as vegans? Three positions have recently
emerged. Marcus William Hunt has argued that parents
should seek a compromise. I have argued that there should
be no compromise on animal rights, but there may be room
for compromise over some ‘unusual’ sources of non-vegan,
but animal-rights-respecting, food. Carlo Alvaro has argued
that both Hunt and I are wrong; veganism is like religion, and
there should be no compromise on religion, meaning there
should be no compromise on veganism. This means that
even my minimal-compromise approach should be rejected.
This paper critiques Alvaro’s zero-compromise veganism,
demonstrating that his case against Hunt’s position is under–
motivated, and his case against my position rests upon mis–
understandings. If vegans wish to reject Hunt’s pro-
compromise position, they should favour a rightist approach,
not Alvaro’s zero-compromise approach
L’escalade dans l’affirmation de l’atrocité de la vie sauvage
Cahiers antispécistes n°41, mai 2018
Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism
Michael Huemer, 2018
The Moral Status of Animals
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2017 
Les trois âges de l’éthique animale
Histoire de la recherche contemporaine, 2015
Strict Vegetarianism Is Immoral (chapitre de livre) [PDF]
Donald W. Bruckner
In The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, Ben Bramble and Bob Fischer, 2015
Comment ne pas manger l’autre
Rue Descartes, 2014
The moral footprint of animal products [Texte]
Agriculture and human values, 2012
If we assume some easily accepted premises, we can justify a thesis that, regardless of the treatment of animals during farming and slaughtering, for example, eating chicken can be 163 times morally worse than eating beef, drinking milk can be 58 times morally better than eating eggs, and eating some types of fish can be even 501 times worse than eating beef. In order to justify such a thesis there is no need to reform common morality by, for example, criticizing its speciesism. The thesis that some animal products are much worse than others can be justified on common moral grounds.
Les principaux courants en éthique animale, in La question animale
Jean-Baptiste Jèneange Vilmer
Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2011
Derrida et la question de l’animal
Does Ethical Meat Eating Maximize Utility?
Social Theory and Practice, 2004
Les rapports entre les hommes et les animaux devront changer, extrait de De quoi demain…
Champs Flammarion, 2001
Les apories de la libération animale : Peter Singer et ses critiques
La pensée de l’exclusion et la pensée de la différence : quelle cause pour quel effet ? [Texte]
Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering
Biology and philosophy, 1995
The case for animal rights
Advances in animal welfare sciences, 1987
Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1980
Philosophy is notorious for its disagreements. Give two philosophers the same premises and we are not surprised that they disagree over the conclusion they think follows from them. Give them the same con- clusion and we expect them to disagree about the correct premises. My remarks in this essay fall mainly in this latter category. Peter Singer and I both agree that we have a moral obligation to be vege- tarians. This is our common conclusion. We do not agree concerning why we have this obligation.
Utilitarianism and vegetarism
Philosophy & public affairs, 1980
Some Animals Are More Equal than Others
Pickering Francis & Norman
A number of philosophers have argued for what they call ‘animal liberation’, comparing it directly with egalitarian causes such as women’s liberation and racial equality and suggesting that, if racism and sexism are rationally indefensible, so is ‘speciesism’. If one ought to give equal consideration to the interests of all human beings, then, so they claim, one must on the same grounds and in the same way recognize that ‘all animals are equal’, be they human or non-human. We believe that this assimilation of ‘animal liberation’ to human liberation movements is mistaken.
All animals are equals [PDF]
Philosophic exchange, 1974