Moral reasons to edit the human genome: picking up from the Nuffield report.
Christopher Gyngell, Hilary Bowman-Smart, Julian Savulescu
Journal of medical ethics, 2019
In July 2018, the Nuffield Council of Bioethics released its long-awaited report on heritable genome editing (HGE). The Nuffield report was notable for finding that HGE could be morally permissible, even in cases of human enhancement. In this paper, we summarise the findings of the Nuffield Council report, critically examine the guiding principles they endorse and suggest ways in which the guiding principles could be strengthened. While we support the approach taken by the Nuffield Council, we argue that detailed consideration of the moral implications of genome editing yields much stronger conclusions than they draw. Rather than being merely ’morally permissible’, many instances of genome editing will be moral imperatives.
Commentary on ‘Moral reasons to edit the human genome’: this is not the moral imperative we are looking for
Journal of medical ethics, 2019
Le vieillissement est-il une maladie ?
Brainstorm n°1, février 2019
Transhumanist science will free women from their biological clocks
Robots, animaux,espaces naturels, vers de nouvelles formes de personnalité juridique au 21ème siècle ?
Journal spécial des sociétés, juin 2019
Le «Procès du transhumanisme»
Quand la justice défend l’acceptabilité de la déshumanisation.
Edouard V. Piely
Pièces et main-d’oeuvre, Juin 2018
Le transhumanisme et les animaux
Comment devenir un post-chien
Cahiers antispécistes n°40, avril 2018
The Mutant Says in His Heart, “There Is No God”: the Rejection of Collective Religiosity Centred Around the Worship of Moral Gods Is Associated with High Mutational Load
Dutton et al.
Evolutionnary psychological science, 2018
The Moral Imperative of Artificial Intelligence
Moshe Y. Vardi
Communications of the ACM, 2016
Mindfulness and the Moral Imperative for the Self to Improve the Self
Richard K. Payne
Handbook of mindfulness, 2016
The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos
Savulescu et al.
Proteins & cells, 2015
Gene editing technologies have enormous potential as a therapeutic tool in the fight against disease. Roughly 6% of all births have a serious birth defect, which is genetic or partly genetic in origin (Christianson et al., 2006). Advanced and precise gene editing techniques could virtually eradicate genetic birth defects, thereby benefiting nearly 8 million children every year. In addition 35% of all deaths are due to chronic diseases, such as cancer and diabetes, in those under 70.1 Gene editing could significantly lower this disease burden thereby benefiting billions of people around the world over time. To intentionally refrain from engaging in life-saving research is to be morally responsible for the foreseeable, avoidable deaths of those who could have benefitted (Singer, 1993). Research into gene-editing is not an option, it is a moral necessity.
Morality (of Transhumanism and Posthumanism), In Post and trans-humanism, an introduction
Robert Ranish, 2014
Thinking Inside the Box: Controlling and Using an Oracle AI
Armstrong, Sanders & Bostrom
Minds and machines, 2012
Procreative beneficience – Cui bono ?
Recently, Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane have defended the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB), according to which prospective parents ought to select children with the view that their future child has ‘the best chance of the best life’. I argue that the arguments Savulescu and Kahane adduce in favour of PB equally well support what I call the Principle of General Procreative Beneficence (GPB). GPB states that couples ought to select children in view of maximizing the overall expected value in the world, not just the welfare of their future child. I further argue that Savulescu and Kahane’s claim that PB has significantly more weight than competing moral principles, such as GPB, lacks justification. A possible argument for PB having significant weight builds on a principle of parental partiality towards one’s own children. But this principle does not support PB; it supports a Principle of Sibling‐Oriented Procreative Beneficence (SPB), according to which parents selecting a child should maximize the benefit of all their children. Indeed, PB itself will in some cases be self‐effacing in favour of SPB.
Prometheus unbound: Transhumanist arguments from (human) nature
Ethical perspectives 2009
The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics, 2007
A history of transhumanist thought
Journal of evolution an technology, 2005
The fable of the dragon tyrant
Journal of medical ethics, 2005
New breeds of humans: the moral obligation to enhance.
Reproductive medicine online, 2005
This paper argues that we have a moral obligation to enhance human beings. It is argued that if one is committed to the moral obligation to treat and prevent disease, one is also committed to genetic and other enhancement in so far as this promotes human well-being. It is argued that this is not eugenic but expresses our fundamental human nature: to make rational decisions and to try to improve ourselves. To be human is to strive to be better.
On Our Obligation to Select the Best Children: A Reply to Savulescu
Immaculada de Melo-Martin
Transhumanism Art Manifesto
Natasha Vita-More, 2003
Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children
Transhumanism (new bottles for new wines)
Sir Julian Huxley.