Espinosa & Treich
Social choice and welfare, 2020
Bob Fischer, Andy Lamey
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2018
As it happens, though, Davis’s argument fails. Matheny (2003) shows that Davisunderestimates the harm involved in raising cattle, and Lamey (2007) makes a goodcase that Davis overestimates the number of animals harmed in plant agriculture.Still, no one contests thatsomeanimals are harmed in plant production. And thispoint is enough to throw a wrench in precautionary arguments, of which the strictvegan argument is an example. As vegans have long appreciated, our choice is notbetween a host of diets that are complicit in harm and an alternative—strictveganism—that’s harm-free. Vegans hope to minimize the harm associated withtheir food choices, but sensible ones are under no illusion that they’ve eliminated itentirely. However, precautionary arguments seem to assume that there is a harm-free alternative. So, either vegans need to run a precautionary argument that doesn’tmake that assumption, or they need to stop relying on precautionary arguments.
Donald W. Bruckner
In The moral complexity of eating meat, Bramble & Fischer
Oxford University press, 2015
The most popular and convincing arguments for the claim thatvegetarianism is morally obligatory focus on the extensive,unnecessary harm done toanimalsand to theenvironmentbyraising animals industrially in confinement conditions (factoryfarming). These arguments may succeed in showing thatpurchasing and consuming industrially raised meat is immoral.They fail, however, to establish that strict vegetarianism isobligatory because they falsely assume that eating vegetablesis the only alternative to eating factory-farmed meat thatavoids the harms of factory farming. Moreover, the verypremises of the arguments imply that eating some (non-factory-farmed) meat rather than only vegetables is morallyobligatory. Therefore, if the central premises of these usualarguments are true, then strict vegetarianism is immoral.
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2012
Human activities affect animals in four broad ways: (1) keeping animals, for example, on farms and as companions, (2) causing intentional harm to animals, for example through slaughter and hunting, (3) causing direct but unintended harm to animals, for example by cropping practices and vehicle collisions, and (4) harming animals indirectly by disturbing life-sustaining processes and balances of nature, for example by habitat destruction and climate change. The four types of activities raise different ethical concerns including suffering, injury, deprivation, and death (of individuals), decline of populations, disruption of ecological systems containing animals, and extinction of species. They also vary in features relevant to moral evaluation and decision-making; these include the number of animals affected, the duration of the effects, the likelihood of irreversible effects, and the degree to which the effects can be controlled. In some cases human actions can also provide benefits to animals such as shelter and health care. Four mid-level principles are proposed to make a plausible fit to the features of the four types of human activities and to address the major ethical concerns that arise. The principles are: (1) to provide good lives for the animals in our care, (2) to treat suffering with compassion, (3) to be mindful of unseen harm, and (4) to protect the life-sustaining processes and balances of nature.
Australian zoologist, 2011
Journal of social philosophy, 2007
The least harm principle may require that humans consume a diet containing large herbivores, not a vegan diet
Stephen L. Davis.
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2003.
Une réponse :
Least harm : a defense of vegetarianism from Steven Davis’s omnivorous proposal.
Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 2003
https://fewd.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_ethik_wiss_dialog/Matheny__G._2003_Defense_of_Veg__in_J._Agric_Ethics.pdf(lien non cliquable)
The effects of harvest on arable wood mice Apodemus sylvaticus
TE Tew, DW MacDonald
Biological conversation, 1993